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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

so by the mandate of the court in order to purge himself of contempt
and to escape confinement in jail.
The only thing that reflects upon Mr. Rubin is that this statement
discloses that he had accepted information as sufficient basis for his
charge of conspiracy without making investigation to determine
whether the information upon which he relied and acted was in fact
true. But this is not ground for disbarment. If all lawyers were disbarred who have started actions relying upon information that was
subsequently found to be unreliable, the number of the members of the
bar would be greatly reduced.
The third charge is also founded upon the affidavit. It was very
lengthy, and, as Mr. Rubin admitted, carried much offensive matter
that should have been omitted. One of his motives in making it was
the hope of it being published. Mr. Rubin had the right of questioning
the jurisdiction (Rubin v. State, 194 Wis., 207). So he can't be censured for questioning the power of the court to proceed with the
investigation.
"The only question that is open is whether he is subject to censure
because of the means adopted by him to present that question. Had
he responded to the request that he appear at the investigation and
meet the proof offered that tended to show that he had been guilty
of unprofessional conduct, as he met and explained it upon this trial,instead of sending the curt response that those conducting the investigation could go to hell,-he would have played the part of a highminded member of .ourprofession." If he had remained passive, nothing would have come of it, but his aggressive opposition was considered as being unprofessional conduct. One may have the right to
question the power of a governmental agency, but he may not do so
by casting aside all orderly procedure and seek to control such agency
by interrupting its proceedings, discrediting it, and intimidating its
officers as did Mr. Rubin. The case upholds Mr. Rubin for his stand
but not for his conduct. Justice Crownhart in his dissenting opinion
in State v. Cannon, supra, said, "If attorneys may be subjected to such
inquisitions and ruthless charges in the future, we may expect a weak
and spineless bar-one that will be afraid to fight the battles of the
poor and humble as they ought to be founght to secure justice."
COSMAS B. YOUNG

Bills and Notes: Negotiability: Reference to Other Instrument.
"A mere reference in a note to another instrument or mere statement of the transaction out of which the note arose does not destroy
its negotiability; but if in a note there is a reference to another agree-
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ment, and it appears from the context that the purpose of the reference
was to burden the note with conditions of the agreement, or if the
referee subjects the note to the terms of the agreement, then the negotiability of the note is destroyed."
The above rule Was laid down in Ferringv. Verwey, Wis., 229 N.W.
46. This was a case of mortgage foreclosure. The notes in question
were in the hands of a purchaser for value in due course. They were
secured by a mortgage on land, which provided as usual in these cases
for insurance to be taken out by the mortgagor for the benefit of the
mortgagee, payment of taxes, and that in case of default of payment
on any of the notes, the principal would fall due immediately, "collectible by suit of law or by foreclosure of the mortgage." The defendant attempted to set up a recoupment on the ground of the payee's
alleged failure to perform certain conditions of the mortgage. Evidence
tending to prove such failure, however, was rejected b the lower
court, which declared that the notes were negotiable and that the defendant had no defense against a purchaser for value in due course.
The Supreme Court affirmed this decision citing Thorp v. Mindeman,
123 Wisconsin 149.
The question hinged on the proposition of whether or not reference
in a note to a collateral agreement destroys its negotiability. By the
overwhelming authority throughout the country where such reference
merely refers to a statement out of which the transaction arose or in a
mortgage to preservation of the security, it does not.
In Thorp v. Mindeman, the leading case in Wisconsin on this point,
it was held that a note which referred to a mortgage as security for
its payment was negotiable; and whereby the agreement the note fell
due in default of payment, this was not a condition which rendered
the time of payment so uncertain as to destroy the negotiability of the
note. And provisions in the mortgage providing that the mortgagor
take insurance for the benefit of the mortgag&e, payment of taxes, and
providing for in'case of failure to comply with the provisions a penalty
in the form of an added lien were all held to be solely a part of the
mortgage and not incorporated into the note as the defendants contended. The court maintained that these provisions were inserted to
preserve the security and does not render the sum promised in the note
so uncertain as to destroy its negotiability. They cited the rule laid
down in Garnet v. Myers, 65 Neb. 280, "If the terms and conditions
of the mortgage are limited to the proper province of the mortgagethat is, to provide security for the indebtedness-its provisions relating
solely to the security will not affect the negotiability of the note."
FRANCIS ACKERMAN
1 Utah Lake

Qrr. Co. v. Allen, 64 Utah 511, 231 P. 818; Treat v. Cooper, (1842)

